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Income Taxes And The Computation Of Lost Future
Earnings In Wrongful Death And Personal
Injury Cases
Neff v. United States'
Platis v. United States
2
Historically, damages recovered in personal injury and wrongful
death actions have been highly variable, even in cases with strikingly
similar facts. Variance which is the product of a jury's discretionary
power is a tolerable component of our judicial system, but variance
which is the product of divergent judicial reasoning must be critically
examined. Two recent federal district court cases illustrate such an
inconsistent judicial approach in the computation of lost future earn-
ings in wrongful death and personal injury cases. Platis v. United
States' involved a suit under the Federal Tort Claims Act, requiring
the application of the Utah wrongful death statute4 in the computa-
tion of compensatory damages. The decedent had a life expectancy
of 31.6 years at the time of his death. He had earned $7,614 as a
cost accountant in the year before his death; he was survived by a wife
and ten year old child. The court's final decree awarded $295,000 to
the plaintiffs: $220,000 to the widow and $75,000 to the child. In
Neff v. United States,' also brought under the Federal Tort Claims
Act, damages were based on the New York wrongful death statute,6
which is similar to that of Utah, and the facts seemed to auger well for
a larger recovery than in Platis. The decedent had a life expectancy
of forty years at the time of his death. Furthermore, his gross earnings
the year before his death amounted to $10,000, and, as an airline pilot,
he had the probability of a much higher income in the future. He was
1. 282 F. Supp. 910 (D.D.C. 1968).
2. 288 F. Supp. 254 (D. Utah 1968).
3. Id.
4. UTAH COD4 ANN. § 78-11-7 (1953).
5. 282 F. Supp. 910 (D.D.C. 1968).
6. N.Y. D4C4D. EST. LAW §§ 130, 132 (McKinney 1949).
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survived by a wife and five children, ages four to ten. The final award
was $334,149.21 : $94,339.21 for the widow and $239,750 to be divided
among the five children.
The disparity in the sums awarded in these two cases is apparent:
the individual beneficiaries of the decedent with the longer life ex-
pectancy and the brighter financial future recovered substantially smaller
amounts. The principal reason for this result is found in the different
methods used by the two courts to compute damages based on lost
future earnings. Platis based its calculation of this element of damages
on the decedent's gross earnings. In contrast, Neff used the decedent's
net earnings, arrived at by deducting an amount representing the
decedent's prospective federal income tax liability.
THE ROOT OF THE PROBLEM: SECTION 104(a)(2)
OF THE INTERNAL REVENUE CODE
Over the years there has been considerable controversy over the
question of whether damages recovered in various legal actions are
taxable as income to the recipient.7 Although "damages received ...
on account of personal injuries or sickness" are excluded from federal
gross income by Section 104 (a) (2) of the Internal Revenue Code,'judicial decisions on damages in other related actions have depended on
an interpretation of the basic concept of income.' The distinction gen-
erally followed is that damages which merely compensate for what can
be termed a loss of capital are not taxable, whereas all other types of
damages fall within the plaintiff's taxable income.' ° This was the
rationale used to justify the statutory exclusion afforded personal in-jury damages in Section 104(a) (2) : "Damages paid for personal in-juries are excluded from gross income because they make the taxpayer
whole from a previous loss of personal rights - because, in effect, they
restore a loss to capital.""
Damages recovered under state wrongful death statutes have
always been excluded from federal income taxation. 2 Early decisions
were based on the general concept of income rather than on any specific
7. See Rev. Rul. 19, 1954-1 Cum. BULL. 179; McWeeney v. New York, N.H.,
& Hart. R.R., 282 F.2d 34, 39 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 870 (1960) ; Comment,
The Taxability of Recoveries in Personal Injury Cases, 39 MARQ. L. Rsv. 56 (1955).
See generally Knickerbocker, The Income Tax Treatment of Damages: A Study in
the DiffiLculties of the Income Concept, 47 CORN. L.Q. 429 (1962).
8. INT. Riv. CODE of 1954, § 104(a) (2). This section was originally enacted
in 1918.
9. See Knickerbocker, The Income Tax Treatment of Damages: A Study in the
Difficulties of the Income Concept, 47 CORN. L.Q. 429 (1962).
10. In Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426 (1955), the Supreme
Court held that punitive damages in anti-trust and fraud actions were income because,
unlike damages for personal injuries, they could not be viewed as a restoration of
lost capital.
11. Starrels v. Commissioner, 304 F.2d 574, 576 (9th Cir. 1962). But damages
for wrongful death and personal injury seem to go beyond a strict "loss to capital"
concept when they begin to compensate for loss of future earnings, which could be
viewed as future profits as well as capital.
12. Rev. Rul. 19, 1954-1 CuM. BULL. 179.
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statutory exclusion.' 3 However, recent cases have based the exemption
on Section 104(a) (2).4 This development finds support in the ex-
pansion which the federal income tax Regulations have given to Sec-
tion 104(a) (2): "The term 'damages . . .' means an amount re-
ceived ... through prosecution of a legal suit or action based upon tort
or tort type rights. . . ."" In addition, many states by statute exclude
"tort-type" damage recoveries from state income taxation.'6
Defense attorneys, in an attempt to utilize the exclusion of wrong-
ful death and personal injury damages from "income" as a means of
reducing their clients' liability, have advanced a persuasive argument.
Since the recipient of "tort-type" damages will not have to pay federal
income taxes on the award, in order to avoid over-compensation of the
plaintiff, the loss of future earnings element of the award should be
based on the plaintiff's or decedent's future net earnings after taxes,
not on his potential gross earnings. 7 Neff accepts this argument,'
while Platis and the majority of American courts reject it.' 9
THE BARRIER OF "SPECULATIVENESS": THE LEGACY OF
Stokes v. United States
Compensation for loss of future earnings is a recognized element
of damages in both personal injury and wrongful death actions. In a
personal injury action, the plaintiff is allowed to recover, inter alia,
the wages he would have earned but for the injury." Death actions
provide similar compensation, although the details vary from state to
13. I.T. 2420, VII-2 CuM. BULL. 123 (1928). See generally Knickerbocker, The
Income Tax Treatment of Damages: A Study in the Diffculties of the Income
Concept, 47 CORN. L.Q. 429 (1962).
14. E.g., Brooks v. United States, 273 F. Supp. 619 (D.S.C. 1967) ; Anderson v.
United Airlines, Inc., 183 F. Supp. 97 (S.D. Cal. 1960).
15. Treas. Reg. § 1.104-1(c) (1956).
16. E.g., CAL. Rtv. & TAX. CODs § 17138(a) (2) (West Supp. 1969) ; MD. ANN.
CODn art. 81, § 280(a) (Supp. 1968) (net taxable income is adjusted gross income
of individual under federal law); N.Y. TAX LAW § 359(2) (e) (McKinney 1966)
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, § 3402-303(B) (5) (Purdon 1964).
17. A collateral, yet distinct argument is often made in these cases. The defense
will often request that a general instruction be made to the jury informing them that
the award they will reach is not taxable. E.g., Dempsey v. Thompson, 363 Mo. 339,
251 S.W.2d 42 (1952). Some cases merely involve a comment of defense counsel to
that effect made before the jury. E.g., Hall v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 5 Ill. 2d 135,
125 N.E.2d 77 (1955). In either situation the purpose is to prevent the jury from
arbitrarily increasing the award in the mistaken belief that the plaintiff will have to
pay taxes on it. Most cases have held that neither the instruction nor the comment
is proper. See, e.g., Prudential Ins. Co. of America v. Wilkerson, 327 F.2d 997 (5th
Cir. 1964) (personal injury); New York Cent. R.R. v. Delich, 252 F.2d 522 (6th
Cir. 1958) (wrongful death) ; Hall v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 5 Ill. 2d 135, 125 N.E.2d
77 (1955) (personal injury); Bergfeld v. New York, Chicago, & St. Louis R.R., 103
Ohio App. 87, 144 N.E.2d 483 (1956) (wrongful death). Contra, Dempsey v.
Thompson, 363 Mo. 339, 251 S.W.2d 42 (1952) (personal injury). See generally
Annot., 63 A.L.R.2d 1393 (1959); Nordstrom, Income Taxes and Personal Injury
Awards, 19 OHIO ST. L.J. 212 (1958) ; Note, Income Taxation and Damages for
Personal Injuries, 50 Ky. L.J. 601 (1962).
18. 282 F. Supp. at 924.
19. 288 F. Supp. at 278. See Annot., 63 A.L.R.2d 1393 (1959).
20. See Rhone v. Fisher, 224 Md. 223, 167 A.2d 773 (1961) ; Dempsey v. Thomp-
son, 363 Mo. 339, 251 S.W.2d 42 (1952) ; RtSTATEMNT OF TORTS §§ 906, 910, 924(1939) ; Nordstrom, Income Taxes and Personal Injury Awards, 19 OHIO ST. L.J.
212, 216 (1958).
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state depending upon the particular type of death statute in force..21
The general rule, however, is that the plaintiff may recover the
pecuniary losses suffered because of the death and that the damages
recovered are based upon the decedent's future earnings. 22  It is in
determining just what these future earnings would have been in both
types of cases that the income tax problem arises.
Given that the basic theory of tort damages is compensation
the return to the plaintiff of what has been taken away by the tort-
feasor - it is difficult to understand how a plaintiff in a personal
injury action can be allowed to recover a tax-free award amounting to
his full wages when, had he not been injured, he would have had to
pay taxes on those wages. Similarly, it is difficult to understand how
a plaintiff in a wrongful death action can be entitled to receive a
tax-free award based on the decedent's prospective earnings before
taxes when the plaintiff's recovery is defined in most jurisdictions as
being limited to the actual pecuniary loss suffered as a result of the
death. 21 In both instances, it seems clear that the plaintiff is recover-
ing more than he is entitled to recover; he receives a tax-free award
based on taxable income from which taxes are not subtracted. None-
theless, until relatively recently, courts had uniformly held that esti-
mating future income taxes was "too conjectural" an issue from which
to determine damages.24 This position was first enunciated in 1944
in Stokes v. United States,25 and has been frequently relied on in
denying consideration of income taxes when computing loss of future
earnings in both personal injury and wrongful death actions.2 6  The
"too conjectural" rationale seems to be supported by two separate lines
21. There appear to be three basic situations. (1) Under the so-called survival
statute, the decedent's cause of action inures to his estate. Thus the decedent's estate
recovers for medical expenses and pain and suffering to the date of death, plus the
additional element of loss of future earnings. See Chase v. Fitzgerald, 132 Conn. 461,
45 A.2d 789 (1946). (2) Under the so-called wrongful death statute, or Lord Camp-
bell's Act, a new cause of action for the death arises in the decedent's family or heirs.
The recovery is usually the pecuniary loss to the heirs caused by the death, which
losses include the decedent's future earnings. See United States v. Guyer, 218 F.2d
266 (4th Cir. 1954) ; Brooks v. United States, 273 F. Supp. 619 (D.S.C. 1967);
Jennings v. United States, 178 F. Supp. 516 (D. Md. 1959). (3) Many states have
both types of statutes. E.g., MD. ANN. CODE art. 67, §§ 1-6 (1967) (wrongful death) ;
MD. ANN. CODE art. 93, § 112 (Supp. 1968) (survival). To prevent duplication of
recovery, recovery under the survival statute is limited to what the deceased would
have recovered had he lived, while the loss of future earnings element is recoverable
only under the wrongful death statute in a separate action. See Rhone v. Fisher, 224
Md. 223, 230, 167 A.2d 773, 777 (1961) (dicta). See generally W. PROSSER, TORTS
§ 121, at 924 (3d ed. 1964) ; Duffy, The Maldistribution of Damages in Wrongful
Death, 19 OHIO ST. L.J. 264, 266, 268, 269 (1958).
22. E.g., Metzger v. S.S. Kirsten Torm, 245 F. Supp. 227 (D. Md. 1965). See
W. PROSSER, TORTS § 121 (3d ed. 1964).
23. See note 22 supra and accompanying text.
24. Phoenix Indemnity Co. v. Givens, 263 F.2d 858, 863 n.4 (5th Cir. 1959) (per-
sonal injury) ; Chicago & N.W. Ry. v. Curl, 178 F.2d 497 (8th Cir. 1949) (personal
injury) ; Stokes v. United States, 144 F.2d 82 (2d Cir. 1944) (personal injury);
Culley v. Pennsylvania R.R., 244 F. Supp. 710 (D. Del. 1965) (wrongful death);
Christopher v. United States, 237 F. Supp. 787 (E.D. Pa. 1965) (personal injury);
Jennings v. United States, 178 F. Supp. 516 (D. Md. 1959) (wrongful death);
Dempsey v. Thompson, 363 Mo. 339, 251 S.W.2d 42 (1952) (personal injury)
Bergfeld v. New York, Chicago, & St. Louis R.R., 103 Ohio App. 87, 144 N.E.2d 483
(1956) (wrongful death). See Annot., 63 A.L.R.2d 1393 (1959).
25. 144 F.2d 82 (2d Cir. 1944).
26. See authorities cited note 24 supra.
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of argument: first, it is bad policy to let a jury decide on an element
of damages without sufficient guidelines to insure the reasonableness
of its decision ;27 and second, if the jury were allowed to subtract pros-
pective taxes from prospective earnings, the practical difficulties in-
volved, such as the consideration by the jury of conflicting testi-
mony of economic experts, would be more than the court could
practicably undertake.28
However, the strength of the "too conjectural" argument can
be seriously questioned. At the time Stokes was decided, tax rates
were extremely high. By early 1944, the maximum personal income
tax rate had been increased to ninety-four per cent.2 However, taxes
had been at a high level for only a short time, and it seemed likely
that at the end of the war they would be immediately reduced to their
low pre-war level. This expectation did not materialize. Income tax
rates have remained high, and today, twenty-five years after Stokes,
few dispute that federal income taxes at substantial rates are a perma-
nent fixture.
Faced with a similar economic situation in the commonwealth
countries, the House of Lords, overturning years of decisions declaring
that subtraction of income taxes when computing damages for loss of
future earnings was too speculative,3" held that lost future earnings
would be computed on the basis of net earnings after taxes."'
POLAR VIEWS: Jennings AND Floyd
The courts are well aware of the growing forcefulness of the
arguments favoring the deduction of prospective income taxes. This
awareness is evidenced in part by the proliferation of less than cogent
arguments to rationalize adherence to the majority rule. Jennings v.
United States 2 is a case in point. Uneasy about relying entirely on
the "too conjectural" argument, but not wishing to depart from the
weight of authority, the Jennings court pointed to other factors to
justify not making the deduction. Events of the decedent's future life
which could have affected his tax liability, such as the birth of other
children, made the applicable tax rate unpredictable. Furthermore,
the court pointed out that the plaintiffs were not really being over-
compensated by the failure to deduct income taxes because they would
be taxed on any income which the award would earn and would be
liable for a large legal fee.
27. See Dempsey v. Thompson, 363 Mo. 339, 251 S.W.2d 42 (1952).
28. See McWeeney v. New York, N.H., & Hart. R.R., 282 F.2d 34 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 364 U.S. 870 (1960).
29. See G. FITE & J. REsE, AN ECONOMic HISTORY OV THE UNITED STATES (2d
ed. 1965).
30. E.g., Billingham v. Hughes, [1949] 1 K.B. 643.
31. British Transport v. Gourley, [1956] A.C. 185, 203:
The obligation to pay tax . . . is almost universal in its application. That obliga-
tion is ever present in the minds of those who are called upon to pay taxes, and
no sensible person any longer regards the net earnings from his trade or pro-
fession as the equivalent of his available income. . . . [There is, I think, no
element of remoteness or uncertainty about its incidence.
32. 178 F. Supp. 516 (D. Md. 1959). The case involved the Maryland wrongful
death statute, MD. ANN. CODE art. 67, §§ 1-6 (1967).
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Other courts have responded to the challenge by adopting what
might be denominated the "ostrich" theory of judicial responsibility."
Christopher v. United States34 is a classic example. Without even an
attempt to formulate a reasoned decision, the Christopher court per-
emptorily dismissed the government's contention that damages re-
coverable by the plaintiff should be reduced by projected income taxes
supporting its ruling only with a brief footnote citation to an out of
date annotation 5
In contrast to Jennings, a number of courts have, in recent years,
decided that income tax liability should be a factor in determining loss
of future earnings in death actions. 6 The leading case is Floyd v.
Fruit Industries.3 T In addition to pointing out that a failure to make
the deduction would result in over-compensation of the plaintiff, Floyd
stressed the point that predicting the prospective taxes of the deceased
was no more speculative than predicting his earning capacity and per-
sonal expenditures, predictions that have traditionally been made in
wrongful death cases. The essence of the decision was the adoption
of a policy directly contrary to the Stokes rationale; the court took
the position that the practical problems involved did not override the
essential justice of making the deduction.
Despite the limited success of the Floyd approach in wrongful
death actions,3 8 there is no substantial American authority to the effect
that income taxes should be considered in computing loss of future
earnings in a personal injury action.3 9  However, there is no logical
reason for not extending the Floyd rule to personal injury actions, since
the rationale of compensation in both wrongful death and personal
injury actions is the same. Regardless of which type of action is in-
volved, the compensation awarded is, at least theoretically, the plain-
tiff's actual loss.
There does, however, seem to be an important drawback to the
Floyd approach. A plaintiff in a wrongful death or personal injury
action receives his losses computed to present value; that is, he receives
33. See, e.g., McWeeney v. New York, N.H. & Hart. R.R., 282 F.2d 34 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 870 (1960), where the court used an inflation argument
to justify not making the deduction.
34. 237 F. Supp. 787 (E.D. Pa. 1965) (purporting to apply Maryland law).
35. Id. at 797 n.3.
36. Cox v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 379 F.2d 893 (7th Cir. 1967) ; United States
v. Sommers, 351 F.2d 354 (10th Cir. 1965) ; O'Connor v. United States, 269 F.2d 579
(2d Cir. 1959) ; Gill v. United States, 285 F. Supp. 253 (E.D. Tex. 1968); Brooks
v. United States, 273 F. Supp. 619 (D.S.C. 1967); Moffa v. Perkins Trucking Co.,
200 F. Supp. 183 (D. Conn. 1961); Meehan v. Central R.R., 181 F. Supp. 594
(S.D.N.Y. 1960) ; Floyd v. Fruit Industries, 144 Conn. 659, 136 A.2d 918 (1957).
37. 144 Conn. 659, 136 A.2d 918 (1957). The case involved the Connecticut
survival statute, under which the measure of damages is the loss to the decedent had
he lived. CONN. GEN. STA r. ANN. §§ 45-280, 52-599 (1960).
38. E.g., Neff v. United States, 282 F. Supp. 910 (D.D.C. 1968). Some of the
later decisions do not seem to be as well reasoned as the Floyd case. For example,
in Brooks v. United States, 273 F. Supp. 619, 630 (D.S.C. 1967), the court supported
its decision to deduct taxes in part by observing that the case was a wrongful death
action and involved a non-jury trial. Neither of these factors seem particularly
germane. But see Wright, Foreword to Symposium - Damages for Personal Injuries,
19 OHIO ST. L.J. 155, 157 (1958).
39. But cf. McWeeney v. New York, N.H., & Hart. R.R., 282 F.2d 34 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 364 U.S. 870 (1960). As noted, the English rule now requires the deduc-
tion. See note 31 supra and accompanying text.
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that sum which, if invested at a reasonable rate of interest, will produce
interest income which, together with the sum originally awarded, will
adequately compensate plaintiff for the losses resulting from the death
or injury.40 In effect, then, part of the plaintiff's compensation is the
interest which will subsequently be generated by the amount the court
awards. However, although the lump sum awarded to the plaintiff is
not taxable, any interest earned on it is taxable.41 Thus, since the
plaintiff will in fact pay taxes on a portion of his award, the Floyd
rationale causes him to "pay" twice - once when prospective federal
income taxes are subtracted from gross earnings to determine net
future earnings and again when taxable interest is earned on the dis-
counted damage award. The problem becomes particularly severe in
a factual situation such as that in Neff, where, because of the long
life expectancy of the deceased, a large portion of the award will be
reflected in subsequent interest. The courts are, thus, faced with a
dilemma: to follow Floyd may result in short-changing the plaintiff,
while to follow Jennings and refuse to subtract taxes at all usually
results in over-compensation.
COMPROMISE SOLUTIONS TO THE
Floyd-Jennings DILEMMA
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, beginning with the
case of McWeeney v. New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad,12
has developed a novel compromise formula, incorporating some of the
better aspects of the Floyd and Jennings approaches. The McWeeney
court declared that income taxes would not be subtracted from lost
future earnings in wrongful death or personal injury actions unless
the amount of taxes involved was sufficiently large to demand such
a deduction:
There may be cases where failure to make some adjustment
for the portion of a plaintiff's or decedent's earnings that would
have been taken by income taxes would produce an improper
result....
For example, if a plaintiff or a plaintiff's decedent, had poten-
tial earnings of $100,000 a year, more than half of which would
have been consumed by income taxes, an award of damages based
on gross earnings would be plainly excessive ... "
The rationale underlying McWeeney is that such deductions are im-
proper in the normal cases because of the speculative nature of the
40. See McWeeney v. New York, N.H., & Hart. R.R., 282 F.2d 34, 37 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 364 U.S. 870 (1960); Nordstrom, Income Taxes and Personal Injury
Awards, 19 OH-IO ST. L.J. 212, 217-18 (1958).
41. Rev. Rul. 29, 1965-1 Cum. BULL. 59. See Jennings v. United States, 178
F. Supp. 516 (D. Md. 1959), where this argument was used to justify a denial of
the deduction.
42. 282 F.2d 34 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 870 (1960). It is notable that
the Second Circuit also decided the Stokes case. See note 25 supra and accompany-
ing text.
43. Id. at 38.
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deduction and because over-compensation of the plaintiff is offset by
attorney's fees, inflationary effects, and the fact that the plaintiff will
have to pay taxes on the interest earned by the award. However, if
the amount of prospective taxes involved becomes very large, then the
cumulative effect of these factors is not sufficient to override the in-
justice of refusing the deduction.
The McWeeney approach has produced some interesting results
in the Second Circuit. In McWeeney, a personal injury action, the
deduction was denied because the plaintiff's earning capacity was only
$5,000 per year. Subsequently, deductions were also denied where a
decedent's earnings capacity was $10,000 per year44 and where the
decedent was a longshoreman, whose income was, presumably, quite
modest.4" Yet the deduction has been made when the decedent's earn-
ing capacity was about $16,000 per year, 46 a sum considerably removed
from the $100,000 income cited in McWeeney as an example of when
the deduction should be made. In Cunningham v. Rederiet Vindeggen
A /S and M/S Trolleggen,4 1 the Second Circuit, clarifying MlcWeeney,
stated that:
The crucial issue is not . . . simply whether libellant would ever
have received any of that portion of decedent's future earnings
which would have been withheld for taxes. Rather, the crucial
issue is whether a court can predict with sufficient certitude just
what portion of decedent's earnings would have been placed beyond
libellant's reach by future tax laws so as to permit the courtjustly to reduce the damage awarded which libellant would other-
wise be entitled to.4 8
The court seems to suggest that the higher the decedent's income, the
easier it is to predict the taxes he would have had to pay, and thus
the more unjust it is to deny the deduction. Implicit in this reasoning
is the questionable premise that unpredictable future events will not
alter the high-income decedent's tax liability to the same extent that
they would alter the lower income decedent's tax liability. Thus, while
the approach adopted by the Second Circuit is a practical compromise
of a difficult problem, the result appears to be that the individual
defendant's right to objective justice depends on the size of the plain-
tiff's, or his decedent's, bank account. 49
The recent case of Beaulieu v. Elliot5" offers another compromise
solution. Beaulieu was a personal injury case in which the court
determined that the plaintiff had lost $10,750 in wages between the
time of the accident and the time of the trial and remanded for a
44. In re Marina Mercante Nicaraguense, S.A., 364 F.2d 118 (2d Cir. 1966);
Montellier v. United States, 315 F.2d 180 (2d Cir. 1963).
45. Cunningham v. Rederiet Vindeggen A/S and M/S Trolleggen, 333 F.2d 308(2d Cir. 1964).
46. Leroy v. Sabena Belgian World Airlines, 344 F.2d 266 (2d Cir. 1965).
47. 333 F.2d 308 (2d Cir. 1964).
48. Id. at 314.
49. See generally 14 VAND. L. Riv. 639 (1961).
50. 434 P.2d 665 (Alaska 1967).
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more explicit finding of his lost future earnings. The court held that
the computation of the final award could reflect the plaintiff's income
tax liability only with respect to the wages lost before the trial;
projected post-trial earnings would not be subject to the deduction.
The reason for this distinction appears to be that the income tax
liability of a plaintiff between accident and trial is a known quantity,
not subject to the "too conjectural" objection. It is arguable, how-
ever, that a plaintiff's income tax liability on wages lost during the
period between accident and trial is still quite speculative. Beaulieu
seems to overlook the fact that there is more involved in the "too
conjectural" argument than the mere uncertainty of the applicable
tax rates. Changes in the plaintiff's individual circumstances, such as
his job and marital status, might have materially altered his tax lia-
bility by affecting the exemptions and deductions available to him
under the Internal Revenue Code. Theoretically, the Anglo-American
legal system measures damages by an educated guess as to what would
have occurred, not what actually happened subsequent to the accident."'
CONCLUSION
It is increasingly clear that the courts are floundering in the face
of the problem of whether to deduct income taxes from prospective
earnings when calculating personal injury and wrongful death dam-
ages. The Stokes rule of simply denying all consideration of income
taxes gave consistent, if unjust, results. Today, at least in wrongful
death actions, many courts are aware of the injustice of an absolute
denial of consideration of income taxes. This realization has taken
three forms. Some courts, as in Jennings, have carried forward the
old rule, adding new justifications to the "too conjectural" argument.
Other courts, as in Floyd, have disagreed and have allowed prospec-
tive taxes to be considered. The Second Circuit, realizing the draw-
backs of both these approaches, has attempted a compromise. It is
submitted that none of these approaches achieves a truly satisfac-
tory result.
One solution to the problem may be to take the Floyd rationale
one step further. Floyd makes the deduction because of the patent
injustice of forcing the defendant to pay a sum greater than the
plaintiff's actual loss, thereby giving the plaintiff a windfall. What
Floyd overlooks is the fact that the interest the damage award earns
is taxable. Since these awards are discounted on an annuity basis, so
that interest to be earned on the amount awarded is part of the total
compensation, the plaintiff is in fact paying taxes on part of his re-
covery. To achieve the best result after making the Floyd deduction,
an amount which represents the tax liability of the plaintiff on the
51. See Slater v. Mexican Nat'l R.R., 194 U.S. 120 (1904), where Mr. Justice
Holmes indicated that the Mexican system of awarding tort damages, having the
defendant pay the plaintiff each year for his actual losses that year due to the injury,
was alien to the American system. The American system is based on what might
happen, not what actually happens. See generally Lawless, Computation of Future
Damages: A View from the Bench, 54 Go. L.J. 1131 (1966).
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interest element of the damage recovery must be added back to the
award.52 Although such a computation would require the same esti-
mation of future tax rates as is required for the Floyd deduction, it
would be considerably less speculative because the farther into the
future the calculations proceed, the less the amount of interest paid, 3
since the recipient of the award will presumably use the original sum
to defray living expenses over the years. While the speculative prob-
lem increases with time, the practical effects of any discrepancy de-
crease. A court willing to go as far as Floyd should have little
hesitancy in taking this final step to rationality.
52. See Morris & Nordstrom, Personal Injury Recoveries and the Federal Income
Tax Law, 46 A.B.A.J. 274, 328 (1960). This amount, when added back to the award,
would have to be reduced to its present value in order to avoid over-compensating
the plaintiff.
53. Nordstrom, Income Taxes and Personal Injury Awards, 19 OHIO ST. L.J. 212,
227 (1958).
